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Abstract. A new approach has emerged in the literature on corruption in the developing 
world that breaks with the assumption that corruption is driven by individualistic self-interest 
and, instead, conceptualizes corruption as an informal system of norms and practices. While 
this emerging neo-institutionalist approach has done much to further our understanding of 
corruption in the developing world, one key question has received relatively little attention: 
how do we explain differences in the institutionalization of corruption between developing 
countries? The paper here addresses this question through a systematic comparison of seven 
developing and newly industrialized countries in East Asia. The argument that emerges 
through this analysis is that historical sequencing mattered: countries in which the ‘political 
marketplace’ had gone through a process of concentration before universal suffrage was 
introduced are now marked by less harmful types of corruption than countries where mass 
voting rights where rolled out in a context of fragmented political marketplaces. The paper 
concludes by demonstrating that this argument can be generalized to the developing world as 
a whole. 
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The historical origins of corruption in the developing world: A 
comparative analysis of East Asia 
 
 
 
Recently, the analysis of corruption in developing countries has undergone a radical revision. 
Specifically, scholars are increasingly emphasizing that we need to move away from studying 
corruption as individualistic acts of deviant behavior and instead acknowledge that corruption 
can become institutionalized as informal rules and routines, thus putting great pressure on 
individuals to perform according to these norms.1 As succinctly put by Della Porta and 
Vannucci (2012: 230; emphasis in the original), ‘[t]he “basic norm” of this invisible legal 
system sanctions the unavoidability of bribes, the rule that recourse to hidden exchange 
cannot be avoided in return for any “resource” of value obtainable from the public structure 
within the corruption network’. Or in the words of Persson et al. (2012: 254; emphasis 
added), ‘in the majority of the world’s countries, corruption is the expected behavior rather 
than the exception’. 
Moreover, not only has the study of corruption in the developing world seen a seismic 
shift in its underlying theoretical assumptions but scholars have also begun to question the 
ways in which we operationalize and measure corruption. In particular, a growing number of 
scholars stress that institutionalized corruption can take very different forms, which, in turn, 
means that our conceptual frameworks should reflect these differences. Thus, whereas 
previous comparative research primarily measured the extent of corruption – relying mostly 
on aggregated expert-based assessments (such as Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index or the World Bank’s ‘control of corruption’ indicator) – there are now 
more and more frameworks that highlight qualitative differences in the organization of 
corruption (for example, Wedeman 1997; Johnston 2005; Kelsall 2013). 
However, while this emerging neo-institutional approach to corruption has undoubtedly 
made a great contribution to furthering our understanding of corruption in the developing 
world, there remains a question that has received almost no attention: how can we explain 
differences in the institutionalization of corruption across developing countries? 
                                                          
1 While this paper focuses on the developing world, it should be pointed out that similar arguments about the 
institutionalized nature of corruption have also been made by academic work exploring corruption in post-
communist societies (e.g. Ledeneva 2006; Roman 2014). 
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To address this question, the paper here will apply Johnston’s typology of corruption to 
East Asia – a geographical region that features a wide variety of corruption types. The 
general argument that emerges from this analytical exercise is that historical sequencing 
matters. As will be shown, the different types of corruption that can be found in 
contemporary East Asia were institutionalized in the mid-20th century when universal 
suffrage was rolled out across the region. Specifically, where universal suffrage was 
introduced under the constraints of a ‘political marketplace’ characterized by a large number 
of significant ‘loyalty sellers’, corruption assumed ‘oligarchs and clans’ or ‘official moguls’ 
forms; where universal suffrage was introduced after the number of loyalty sellers had been 
significantly reduced, corruption came to be locked into the ‘elite cartel’ type.  
To make this argument, the paper will begin by providing a comprehensive literature 
review that outlines the methodological shift in recent corruption research. Based on the 
emerging neo-institutional approach to corruption, the remainder of the paper will then, first, 
map different qualitative types of corruption across East Asia and, second, show how these 
different types can be traced back to the historical moment at which political elites were 
forced to make strategic decisions over how to mobilize the masses in electoral contests. To 
conclude, the paper will generalize these findings to the developing world as a whole. 
 
 
Studying corruption: from institutional economics to neo-institutionalism 
 
Ever since academic research began to take a stronger interest in causal explanations of 
corruption, the institutional economics approach has been the dominant inquiry paradigm. 
Based on a conventional rational choice model and set against the foil of the so-called 
principal-agent problem, the institutional economics approach makes the assumption that the 
agent is always interested in maximizing his or her own payoff from corrupt behavior, while 
the principal is interested in minimizing the welfare costs that come with corruption. For 
example, in a much cited study of political corruption framed through the institutional 
economics approach, Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) take it as a given that voters (the 
principal) ‘prefer honest officials to elected ones who enrich themselves through payoffs’, 
while politicians (the agent) are driven by the goals of ‘individual wealth and reelection’. In 
other words, for the institutional economics approach, both the agent’s and the principal’s 
interests are exogenously determined. 
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Under these assumptions, the institutional economics approach predicts that corrupt 
acts occur when a rationally acting agent, after performing a risk-profit calculation, decides 
that the potential profit of engaging in corruption outweighs the risks (e.g., see Rose-
Ackerman 2010; Kunicová 2006). Whereas the profit factor refers to the question of how 
much there is to steal – for example, proponents of the institutional economics approach have 
argued that the expected profits of corruption are larger under conditions of a heavily 
regulated market (e.g., Gerring and Thacker 2005; Djankov et al. 2002) and a resource-rich 
economy (e.g. Vicente 2010) – the risk factor refers to the principal’s ability to monitor and 
punish the agent for corrupt behavior. The latter, in turn, is a direct function of institutional 
factors. For example, research following the institutional economic approach suggests that 
the monitoring capacity of the agent will be strengthened through a decentralization of 
government (Damania et al. 2004) and greater press freedom (Brunetti and Weder 2003), 
while accountability is facilitated by presidential systems of government (Panizza 2001) and 
plurality electoral systems (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). In short, the institutional 
economics approach puts forward the argument that corruption is largely the product of 
institutional incentive structures. 
Recently, however, the institutional economics approach has come under heavy 
criticism from the neo-institutionalist approach to corruption. While still retaining a rational 
choice framework, the neo-institutionalist approach departs from the institutional economics 
approach by recognizing that only some preferences being pursued by individuals are 
exogenously given – such as the drive towards self-interest maximization – while other 
preferences may be endogenously determined by the behavior of other individuals. 
Specifically, the neo-institutionalist approach to corruption disagrees with the view that 
individuals’ honesty or dishonesty can be assumed to be fixed exogenously; instead, whether 
an individual decides to remain ‘clean’ or engage in corrupt behavior is a function of 
interactions between individuals. In particular, the two variants of the neo-institutionalist 
approach – the game-theoretic and the transaction costs version – argue that the risks of 
engaging in corruption behavior depends on whether interaction between individuals has led 
to an institutionalization of corruption, with corrupt transactions regulated by informal rules 
and practices. 
According to the game-theoretic variant of the neo-institutionalist approach, the risk of 
engaging in corruption is lower in a high-corruption equilibrium – that is, in a context where 
corruption is systemic and widespread – because there will simply be no principals to 
‘operate’ formal monitoring and punishment mechanisms, and hold agents accountable for 
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their corrupt behavior (e.g. Rothstein 2011; Persson et al. 2012; Persson et al. 2013). This is 
due to a classic collective action problem: because corruption is the expected behavior, 
individuals cannot trust other individuals that they will act clean and play their part as 
principal. As a result – knowing that their individual contribution will make little, if any, 
contribution to holding the agent accountable for corruption – it is most rational for each 
individual to free ride on others’ anti-corruption efforts. 
The transaction costs version of the neo-institutionalist approach, on the other hand, 
highlights two different mechanisms to explain how inter-individual interaction shapes the 
agent’s risk calculation. First, the institutional economics approach is criticized for modeling 
corrupt acts as one-off exchanges. Instead, the transaction costs approach stresses how, if 
corrupt acts are carried out repeatedly between the same partners, mutual trust will grow 
stronger, thus generating the expectation that the other side will abstain from fraud or 
betrayal (Graf Lambsdorff 2007). Second, the transaction costs approach maintains that, in a 
high-corruption equilibrium, the risk of getting caught and punished for corrupt behavior is 
lower than in a low-corruption equilibrium because information and skills regarding the 
‘logistics’ of corruption are more widespread, and because the large-scale reproduction of 
corrupt exchanges may have prompted the emergence of actors who specialize in the 
enforcement of exchange contracts (Della Porta and Vannucci 2012). 
Irrespective of the different causal mechanisms put forward for why systemic 
corruption may reproduce itself over time, the two sub-strands of the neo-institutional 
approach highlight the same phenomenon: corruption can become institutionalized as an 
informal system of norms and practices that shapes individuals’ strategic thinking and 
behavior. Under circumstances of institutionalized corruption, individuals see corruption as 
the standard process to ‘get things done’ rather than deviant behavior that violates prevailing 
norms. As a result, formal institutions will – in contradiction to what the institutional 
economics approach argues – lose their constraining effect on individual behavior. 
Importantly, the neo-institutionalist assumption that individuals’ preferences are 
endogenously shaped by how other individuals behave has implications for the 
conceptualization of corruption. Whereas research based on the institutional economics 
approach commonly employs a quantitative measure of corruption – that is, the dependent 
variable is the extent of corruption in a political system – the neo-institutional argument calls 
attention to possible qualitative differences in the institutionalization of corruption. In fact, a 
growing body of research shows that such qualitative differences matter when it comes to 
analyzing the effects of corruption. For example, several studies have shown that whether 
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corruption has a harmful effect on the quality of governance and economic development 
depends on its industrial organization, not on its sheer extent (for example, Khan 2000; Rock 
and Bonnett 2004; Kelsall 2013). Likewise, various authors have argued that anti-corruption 
measures need to be tailored to specific types of corruption; a ‘one size fits all’ approach will 
not work (e.g., Szeftel 1998; Johnston 2005). 
However, despite these important theoretical and empirical contributions, the neo-
institutionalist approach has paid very little attention to the question of how corruption 
becomes institutionalized in the first place. In other words, how do we explain differences in 
the institutionalization of corruption between countries? Specifically, why do corruption 
markets differ in their degree of organization, their risk profile, and their key actors?  
 
 
Corruption in East Asia 
 
To begin to tackle these questions, this section will apply one of the most widely cited 
typologies of corruption – Johnston’s (2005; 2008; 2014) four-type framework – to the 
developing and newly industrialized countries of East Asia.2 While this sample does not 
contain any cases of ‘influence market’ corruption, which are generally hard to find in the 
developing world, it includes Johnston’s three other types of corruption, thus allowing for a 
systematic inquiry into the factors that shape the institutionalization of corruption.  
 
Elite cartels, ‘big men’, and moguls 
 
Essentially, Johnston puts forward three questions to identify different types of corruption: 
Who are the principal actors around whom corruption is organized? What are these actors 
seeking to achieve through corruption? And how do they employ corrupt activities to attain 
their objectives? Framed through these questions, it becomes clear that East Asia’s 
developing and newly industrialized countries fall into three types: ‘elite cartel’ corruption 
                                                          
2 East Asia’s command economies and transition economies (North Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
Myanmar) are excluded from the analysis, based on the assumption that these political system provide a very 
specific context for the institutionalization of corruption and are thus difficult to compare with the capitalist 
economies in the region (South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia). 
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(Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia), ‘oligarchs and clans’ corruption (Thailand, 
Philippines), and ‘official moguls’ corruption (Indonesia) (see Table 1). 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
Singapore, despite the fact that quantitative, expert-based measurements of corruption (such 
as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index or the World Bank’s ‘control 
of corruption’ indicator) tend to rank the country among the world’s ‘cleanest’, shows 
tendencies of ‘elite cartel’ corruption. The most obvious symptom of this is the politicization 
of the state bureaucracy by the dominant People’s Action Party (PAP) and anecdotal 
evidence that high-ranking party officials use state-owned enterprises (the so-called 
government-linked companies, GLC) as a source of rents (e.g. Rodan 2006; Haggard and 
Low 2002). The ‘fusion of party and state’ (Grzymala-Busse 2008) – and hence the collusion 
between political and bureaucratic elites – also becomes evident through the electoral 
process, as PAP-controlled constituencies are typically treated preferentially over opposition-
held districts when it comes to the allocation of certain government programs (e.g. housing 
subsidies, infrastructural upgrades). 
Even clearer cases of ‘elite cartel’ corruption can be found in Taiwan, South Korea and 
Malaysia. Here, collusive intra-elite networks extend beyond the institutions of the state to 
also include non-state actors. However, the operating logic is the same: corruption serves to 
strengthen the loyalty within intra-elite networks, with the aim to pre-empt or to co-opt rising 
competitors. In Taiwan, collusive networks tend to be highly localized and organized around 
individual politicians. Typically, patron-client networks connect politicians to so-called local 
factions (difang paixi), with the purpose of exchanging public resources and services (e.g. 
contracts, credit, protection for illegal business) for the delivery of votes and the provision of 
campaign funding (e.g. Göbel 2012; Huang and Wang 2010). In South Korea, on the other 
hand, collusive intra-elite networks have historically been organized at the national level. A 
highly institutionalized system of kickbacks was first set up under military rule (1961-1987), 
whereby senior party officials collected fixed payments from business conglomerates (the so-
called chaebol) in exchange for access to public resources (credit, import licenses etc.). Yet, 
Wad observes how ‘the structure of this ‘politics-economy’ collusion was not dismantled 
with the rise of democracy’ (2002: 210). Rather, the introduction of free elections in the late 
1980s meant that the number of collusive networks multiplied, with the chaebol channeling 
financial resources to those politicians with a good chance of winning the presidential office 
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(Park 2008: 115). Similarly, in Malaysia, authoritarian rule under the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) has also bred institutionalized forms of bribery at the national level, as 
many businesses ‘retain, cultivate and ultimately rely on their connections with top UMNO 
leaders to secure continued patronage while, in turn, providing financial and other backing 
for their political patrons’ (Jomo and Gomez 2000: 296). 
While ‘elite cartel’ corruption is thus organized around networks of colluding elites, the 
principal actors under the ‘oligarchs and clans’ type of corruption are ‘big man’ networks that 
specialize in the large-scale theft of public resources. The often violent scramble among these 
networks for access to public resources means that the boundaries between public and private 
become indistinct; meanwhile, the gains from corruption are constantly under threat from 
other networks. 
In the Philippines, ‘big man’ networks usually take the form of political machines 
under the control of political clans. These machines are essentially ‘vehicles for raiding the 
state and distributing political and economic largesse’, based on institutionalized linkages 
with key actors in the local political economy, such as the bureaucracy, legal and illicit 
business, print and broadcast media, and civil society associations (Teehankee 2012: 207-
208). The dense networks of informal linkages that political clans maintain in their respective 
bailiwicks have essentially resulted in a ‘privatization of public resources’ at the local level 
(McCoy 1994: 10). Moreover, through temporary alliances with other clientelistic machines 
manifested in loosely structured political parties, clans gain almost unchecked access to 
resources at the national level, such as economic rents (cartels, monopolies), patronage, and 
pork barrel spending (Hutchcroft 2000a). 
In Thailand, the most effective ‘big man’ networks have evolved around so-called rural 
godfathers (chao pho in Thai), described by Anderson as ‘mafioso-like politician capitalists 
who, by the use of violence, political connections, and control of local markets and rackets, 
become feared provincial bosses’ (1990: 42). Typically, chao pho networks will reach 
upwards to governmental officials (elected politicians, bureaucrats, police and military 
officers) and, through the mechanism of vote buying, downwards to the electorate (Ockey 
2000: 85). Competition for access to economic rents controlled by the central government is 
even fiercer than in the Philippines. Critically, networks controlled by political actors not 
only compete against each other but also against networks controlled by military officers, 
with the latter having a hand in marauding practices such as budget and procurement fraud, 
and illicit business activities (e.g. narcotics trafficking, extortion rackets, illegal bookmaking) 
(Pasuk et al. 1998). However, once a cabinet position is secured, the same operating logic 
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kicks in as in the Philippines, as political actors ‘use access to corruption revenue (granting 
concessions, skimming off funds, or auctioning top positions in the bureaucracy) to recoup 
their elections expenses, accumulate financial resources for the next election and consolidate 
or build on the number of MPs under their control’ (Wingfield 2002: 266). 
Finally, Indonesia is a case of ‘official moguls’ corruption – distinguished from 
‘oligarchs and clans’ corruption by the fact that the ‘owners’ of corruption networks face very 
little legal or political restraint when fueling their networks with public and private assets. In 
Indonesia, “official mogul” networks tend to be controlled by key officials and party 
apparatchik of the former Suharto regime (1966-1998), who were able to reinvent themselves 
as parliamentarians and executive politicians, and have used their control over political office 
to forge informal links with business interests, bureaucrats, organized crime, and even 
military and police commands (Hadiz and Robinson 2013). Networks aim to ensure 
continued access to the state apparatus by recruiting vote brokers, who, in turn, mobilize 
voters through the delivery of material goods – either through vote buying or clientelistic 
exchange relations (Aspinall 2014). Moguls unilaterally abuse their position of political 
power to suck public resources out of the state or to extort assets from private entities. 
Examples include politicians diverting state funds directly into party coffers (Mietzner 2007: 
247), senior bureaucrats running ‘semi-formalized’ systems whereby positions in the civil 
service are ‘sold’ to the highest bidders (Blunt et al. 2012), and military officers being 
involved in a range of illicit businesses, from illegal logging and mining to protection rackets 
and smuggling (Mietzner and Misol 2012: 109). 
 
Towards a sequential argument 
 
To account for the differences in the institutionalization of corruption across East Asia, the 
remainder of this paper will put forward an ordered sequential argument, in which ‘the 
temporal order of the events in a sequence is causally consequential for the outcome of 
interest’ (Falleti and Mahoney 2015: 218). Specifically, it is argued that when a concentration 
of the ‘political marketplace’ preceded the introduction of mass suffrage, corruption became 
institutionalized as the ‘elite cartel’ type; when mass suffrage was adopted in a context of a 
fragmented marketplace, corruption became locked into either ‘oligarchs and clans’ or 
‘official moguls’ forms.  
Following de Waal (2009), politics can be conceptualized as a set of marketplaces in 
which ‘sellers’ of loyalty offer their allegiance to the highest bidder. These marketplaces of 
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loyalty operate at different levels of the political system – for example, marketplaces operate 
within the metropolitan elite but they also connect metropolitan elites to provincial elites. The 
price that loyalty sellers can extract for their allegiance depends on the value of politically 
relevant resources they control. In particular, the relative bargaining power of loyalty sellers 
depends on their stock of mobilizational and coercive resources – in other words, their social 
control over parts of the population and their ability to resist the enforcement of official 
policies through violent means. 
When mass suffrage is implemented under conditions of a fragmented marketplace – 
that is, a marketplace in which politically relevant resources are distributed among a larger 
number of elites – a strong element of uncertainty is injected into the political system. 
Generally speaking, the introduction of elections always increases the level of uncertainty 
into elite interaction (see Przeworski 1991) – mainly because the selection of leaders 
becomes less predictable and because it is difficult to foresee whether all relevant actors will 
commit themselves to the new rules of the game. In fragmented marketplaces, however, the 
uncertainty introduced by elections is disproportionately larger than in concentrated 
marketplaces. The reasons for this may vary. For example, the marketplace may feature 
powerful coercive entrepreneurs (such as warlords or militia leaders) who – due to the 
resources they control – have the ability to sabotage the electoral process and resist the 
implementation of laws passed by elected governments. Similarly, uncertainty introduced by 
elections can be higher in fragmented marketplaces as there may be provincial elites in 
control of significant mobilizational resources (such as landlords). Under circumstances 
where mobilizational resources are dispersed over a large number of autonomous vote banks, 
the predictability of election outcomes is very low, as elites in control of these vote banks 
may unforeseeably decide to change sides. 
To lower the level of uncertainty, those elites with an interest in capturing national 
office will be forced to secure the loyalty of coercive entrepreneurs and vote bank owners. 
However, there are two issues here. To begin with, coercive entrepreneurs and vote bank 
owners are unlikely to provide loyalty in exchange for access to formally institutionalized 
career paths into public office, as it is precisely the weakness of formal public institutions that 
makes these actors powerful. Alternatively, loyalty buyers could buy off coercive 
entrepreneurs and vote bank owners one by one; yet the problem here is that such one-off 
payments do not prevent the loyalty seller from reneging on the agreement.  
A more stable solution is to institutionalize corruption on a large scale, governed by 
informal rules for resource distribution and conflict resolution. As neo-institutional scholars 
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argue (e.g. Graf Lambsdorff 2007; Della Porta and Vannucci 2012), the repetition of 
corruption interactions over time will increase trust between actors and, driven by actors’ 
anticipation of future exchanges, create incentives to honor agreements. Accordingly, when 
mass suffrage is introduced in a context of a fragmented political marketplace, the best option 
for electorally ambitious elites to secure the loyalty of coercive and mobilizational 
entrepreneurs is to institutionalize corruption in such a way so as to allow the latter to nurture 
autonomous ‘big men’ and ‘moguls’ networks.  
As will be outlined in more detail in the next two sections, when universal suffrage was 
rolled out across East Asia in the mid-20th century, political marketplaces differed 
significantly from one another in terms of how mobilizational and coercive resources were 
distributed – with important implications for the institutionalization of corruption (see Figure 
1). 
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
In the Philippines, which saw universal suffrage being established under American colonial 
rule as early as 1935, mobilizational resources were largely in the hands of landholders who, 
through patron-client relationships with peasants, controlled large vote banks. Politicians 
seeking control of executive office at the national level bought the loyalty of these 
landowning clans by deliberately keeping state institutions weak and allowing “big men” to 
plug their networks directly into the state for the extraction of public resources. This laid the 
foundation for the Philippines’ ‘oligarchs and clans’ corruption. 
In Thailand, where the implementation of electoral competition was a more protracted 
affair, the key to understanding the institutionalization of ‘oligarchs and clans’ corruption is 
the distribution of coercive resources in the post-WWII political marketplace. Critically, the 
Thai military was highly factionalized, which resulted in a recurring pattern of coups and 
counter-coups. Hence, when competitive elections were gradually rolled out from the mid-
1940s onwards, political elites – driven by the constant threat of military intervention – 
refrained from investing in political party organizations as mobilizational vehicles. Instead, 
they turned to the aforementioned chao pho, thus paving the way for corruption to become 
institutionalized around the latter’s informal networks. 
In Indonesia, the political marketplace was also characterized by fragmented control 
over coercive resources. Specifically, a prolonged guerrilla war against the Dutch colonialists 
had facilitated the emergence of regional warlords. To incorporate these coercive 
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entrepreneurs into the post-colonial democratic project, the national government saw itself 
forced to dismantle the bureaucratic state that the Dutch had left behind, thereby nurturing 
formidable ‘mogul’ networks that still dominate the corruption market in Indonesia today. 
In contrast, in Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia, control over both the 
means of organizing violence and the means of mobilizing political support was much more 
concentrated. This meant that, when universal suffrage was implemented, political actors 
striving to gain or maintain control of the state did not have to buy cooperation from a 
fragmented base of loyalty sellers. The consequence of this was that rulers were able to invest 
in universalistic procedures and professional norms to govern the operation of state 
organizations. Stronger political institutions and a greater role for formal organizations, in 
turn, meant that corruption became institutionalized as the ‘elite cartel’ type. 
Once institutionalized in the mid-20th century, these different forms of corruption 
reproduced themselves over time. Confirming the arguments developed by the neo-
institutional approach to corruption, processes of reproduction have remained locked into a 
‘path-dependent’ trajectory despite significant changes to the formal institutional set-up of 
political systems. Perhaps most remarkably, ‘oligarchs and clans’ and ‘official moguls’ forms 
of corruption do not seem to have been negatively affected by processes of political change 
that replaced ‘electoral authoritarian’ regimes with fully fledged democracies in the 1980s 
and 1990s. This is contrary to the theoretical expectations of the institutional economics 
approach, whose proponents argue that the introduction of democratic processes should 
increase the risks of engaging in corruption – mainly by strengthening both the principal’s 
monitoring abilities (through a free press and civil society organizations as well as the 
separation of judicial power) and punishment capacity (through the electoral accountability 
mechanism).  
The path-dependency of ‘big men’ and ‘moguls’ corruption in the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Thailand can be explained by corruption networks’ ability to hijack and 
‘switch off’ democracy’s formal monitoring and punishment institutions. For example, 
research on the new democracies in Southeast Asia has shown that law-enforcement and 
judicial authorities are often themselves embedded in complex corruption networks (e.g. 
Rogers 2004; McLeod 2005; Pasuk and Sangsit 1996). They thus have no incentive to 
effectively fight corruption, as this would deprive them of their own extortion and criminal 
rackets. Similarly, ‘big men’ and ‘moguls’ networks often also succeed in co-opting civil 
society and the media – either by threatening to deploy violence or by ‘buying’ their support 
with material incentives (e.g., Tomsa 2015). Finally, as already touched on above, corruption 
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networks in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand typically extend into the electorate 
through patron-client linkages. This essentially removes voters’ incentives to punish corrupt 
politicians by voting them out of power.  
The sequential argument about the path-dependency of corruption is again summarized 
in Figure 2. The key components of this argument are the antecedent conditions 
(concentration of the political marketplace), the critical juncture (introduction of mass 
suffrage in the mid-20th century), and the reproduction of institutionalized forms of 
corruption after the end of the critical juncture.  
 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
 
 
Institutionalizing corruption 
 
The following section will develop the neo-institutional argument in more detail. In 
particular, it will be shown how – at the critical juncture when universal suffrage was 
implemented – particular historical processes had led to highly fragmented political 
marketplaces in some cases and more concentrated marketplaces in other cases. In a second 
step, it will be demonstrated how these varying degrees of market concentration created 
different incentives for the institutionalization of corruption. 
 
… in fragmented marketplaces 
 
When universal suffrage was implemented in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, 
political marketplaces commanded high prices for loyalty and cooperation. In the Philippines, 
colonialism had resulted in decentralized control over resources for the mobilization of 
voters, while marketplaces in Indonesia and Thailand featured a significant number of 
political entrepreneurs who used their control over the organization of violence to sell their 
allegiance in return for access to state resources. In all three countries, high market rates for 
loyalty resulted in the institutionalization of either ‘oligarchs and clans’ or ‘official moguls’ 
corruption. 
The Philippines – which was under Spanish possession between the mid-16th century 
and 1898, and subsequently American control until 1946 – never experienced a significant 
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investment in centralized political structures by colonial authorities. Reflecting its peripheral 
and unimportant status, during the period of Spanish colonialism the Philippines was 
administered through a system of indirect rule that relied on the Catholic Church and local 
strongmen for the exercise of political power (Sidel 1999: 14-15). The latter saw a significant 
boost in their power when, in the early 19th century, the Spaniards commercialized Filipino 
agriculture, thus giving strongmen the opportunity to amass vast tracts of land to establish 
hacienda-like plantations. Thus, by the time the Americans took over, the Philippines had 
seen the consolidation of provincial fiefdoms built on strongmen’s economic power and 
social control over local populations through patron-client networks.  
The Americans, similar to the Spaniards, did not invest in territory-wide bureaucratic 
institutions. Instead, driven by the goal of preparing the Philippines for independence and 
self-government, US colonial authorities prioritized the implementation of elections as a 
mechanism of political control. And, significantly, the way in which elections were rolled out 
– starting at the local level and moving up to the national level – allowed provincial 
strongmen to turn their local fiefdoms into electoral bailiwicks (Anderson 1988: 7-11). 
Indirect colonial rule and the particular process of decolonization thus contributed to a 
political marketplace in which control over mobilizational resources was highly fragmented 
in the hands of provincial strongmen. As a consequence, politicians striving for national 
office saw themselves forced to ‘buy’ the loyalty of these provincial elites, which most 
visibly manifested itself in the emergence of loosely structured political parties that were 
merely ‘a working alliance of patron-client systems’ (Landé 1965: 75). To facilitate the buy-
in of provincial elites, state designers created a bureaucratic apparatus that would be only 
weakly insulated from politicians’ demands. To begin with, national legislators were given 
wide discretion over the disbursement of pork-barrel funds and making patronage 
appointments in bureaucratic agencies. This not only allowed national politicians to fuel 
patron-client ties with provincial elites in control of significant vote banks – who, in turn, 
would use these payments to further strengthen the loyalty of their vote banks (Hutchcroft 
and Rocamora 2003: 271-272) – but, at the same time, the ‘systems of patronage 
overwhelmed the capacity of central agencies to supervise lower levels of government’ 
(Hutchcroft 2000b: 296). The result of the latter was that provincial elites effectively came to 
exercise ‘monopolistic personal control over coercive and economic resources in their 
territorial jurisdictions or bailiwicks’ (Sidel 1999: 141). Overall then, these design choices 
institutionalized a system of ‘oligarchs and clans’ corruption under which the state apparatus 
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would repeatedly be choked by ‘an anarchy of particularistic demands’ (Hutchcroft 1998: 13) 
from vertically integrated networks seeking to fuel patron-client ties with public resources.  
In Indonesia, unlike in the Philippines, the post-colonial marketplace featured a high 
concentration of mobilizational resources. Colonialism was again an important factor that 
shaped these market dynamics. First, while initially making heavy use of indigenous political 
structures to sustain political power over the Indonesian archipelago, the Dutch colonialists 
increasingly moved towards a more direct form of administration. For one, during the second 
half of the 19th century, indigenous elites were, step by step, integrated into the colonial 
Beamtenstaat, which significantly undermined traditional modes of social control (Sutherland 
1979). Moreover, although formally retaining a dualistic legal system that featured two sets 
of courts and laws – one based on European norms, the other one on traditional (adat) laws – 
in reality, the system became more and more subjected to control from the center, thus 
effectively stripping customary courts of their powers (Lev 1985). Second, in combination 
with the peculiar form of feudal landownership in pre-colonial society, the growing 
importance of the colonial state in managing economic activity produced a system of 
capitalist agriculture that was dominated by foreign-owned plantations and wage labor 
(Robison 2009: 10-15). This meant that a large number of peasants were able to escape 
clientelistic practices, which made them available for alternative modes of mobilization by 
metropolitan elites (Utrecht 1976). 
However, while control over the organization of political mobilization was thus highly 
centralized, the same cannot be said about the control over coercive resources. Most 
significantly, years of guerrilla warfare against the Dutch meant that local military units had 
become largely self-sufficient by developing an independent economic base – often in the 
illegal economy. As Anderson (2008: 50) explains, ‘[s]ome provincial military commanders, 
headed towards warlord status, began to create their own hidden budgets by protecting 
smugglers, controlling local export revenues and practising extortion’. When the central 
government sought to turn the revolutionary guerrilla forces into a disciplined and 
professional army – which would have resulted in reduced informal profit-making 
opportunities for provincial commanders – this triggered a series of local armed revolts 
(Crouch 1985: 54-55). Although successfully crushing the revolts, elites in Jakarta continued 
to perceive ‘danger of political adventurism by regional military leaders’ and thus largely 
shelved their reform plans (Mietzner 2009: 49). Instead, they decided to institutionalize 
corruption as a mechanism to buy the loyalty of coercive entrepreneurs. 
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The first step in this direction was to abolish the dualistic legal structure inherited from 
the Dutch in favor of the weaker adat side of the structure, which ‘made it much easier for 
Indonesia’s military and political elites to gut the legal system of its autonomy and 
subordinate it to executive power’ (Winters 2011: 153). Subsequently – first under Sukarno’s 
Guided Democracy regime (1957-1966), then to an even greater extent under Suharto’s New 
Order regime (1966-1998) – army officers were placed in key government and administration 
roles, and a massive expansion of military business activities was encouraged. Provincial 
commanders were thus given ample opportunities to fuel their personal networks through 
corrupt activities – either by ‘selling’ public licenses, permits and contracts to private market  
actors, siphoning off funds from military-controlled companies, or running illicit operations 
(such as illegal logging or mining, smuggling, or drug trafficking) (Crouch 1975). And thus 
the seed for Indonesia’s “official moguls” corruption had been planted. 
In Thailand, too, the fragmented control over coercive resources is key to understand 
the institutionalization of corruption in the second half of the 20th century. The reasons for 
this fragmentation were very different from Indonesia’s historical experience. Starting in the 
late 19th century, Thai monarchs had implemented a number of bureaucratic reforms with the 
aim of strengthening the state and halting the advancement of Western colonial powers. The 
king retained the right to appoint and remove senior civil servants at his will, which, in 1932, 
provoked a coup from young officers, who set themselves the goal of opening up higher 
ranks in the military to non-aristocrats (Wilson 1962: 173). The 1932 coup and the 
abolishment of the absolute monarchy installed the military as the most powerful institution 
in Thai politics; yet, critically for the discussion here, the military was high factionalized 
along ideological lines. 
Factionalism in the military fragmented the control over the organization of violence. 
As was reflected in the large number of (successful and unsuccessful) coups in the years 
before and after WWII, ‘the use of force became the ultimate arbiter of political disputes 
between rival factions within the military elite’ (Beeson and Bellamy 2008: 106). It was in 
this context of heightened insecurity that elections were gradually implemented.3 The 
implications were profound. Most importantly, political elites refrained from setting up well-
organized parties to compete in the newly created elections, as they feared that – in the event 
                                                          
3 As a matter of fact, universal suffrage had already been granted in 1932; however, parliamentary elections 
remained indirect, with voters electing sub‐district representative who then elected members of parliament at the 
provincial level. A directly elected parliament was only introduced in 1948. Subsequently, a political party law 
that extended level recognition to political parties was passed in 1955. 
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of a coup – party assets could be seized (Ockey 1994: 255). Instead, political elites invested 
in patron-client networks as the main organizational vehicles. ‘Intra-elite rivalry’, as Doner 
and Ramsay (1997: 250) note, ‘meant that networks were critical’. In particular, ‘big man’ 
networks grouped around senior military leaders who, in order to strengthen their networks, 
engaged in activities that are characteristic of ‘oligarchs and clans’ corruption: extracting 
resources directly out of the state to feed into the network and awarding corruption 
‘franchises’ to network members (Scott 1976: 302-303). 
With economic development giving rise to new social forces, the number of relevant 
‘big man’ networks multiplied. Specifically, the emerging Bangkok-based business elite, in 
its ambitions to take over the institutions of (semi-democratic) representation, turned towards 
rural bosses – earlier referred to as ‘godfathers’ (or chao pho) – who, because of the 
monopolistic quality of their economic activities and/or their involvement in organized crime, 
were able to deliver large blocks of votes. This led to a system of ‘competitive clientelism’ 
(Doner and Ramsay 1997) whereby different networks competed over access to corruption 
revenues with which to strengthen their client base. 
 
… in concentrated marketplaces 
 
In contrast to the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, political marketplaces in Singapore, 
Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia had gone through processes of concentration before 
universal suffrage was established in the mid-20th century. As the political marketplaces did 
thus not contain significant sellers of loyalty when metropolitan elites prepared to organize 
vehicles for mass mobilization, corruption became institutionalized in the ‘elite cartel’ type. 
As will be shown in the following section, the ways in which processes of political party 
formation unfolded within these contexts of concentrated marketplaces can explain the more 
subtle differences in the institutionalization of ‘elite cartel’ corruption. 
To begin with, it can be observed that political marketplaces at the critical juncture of 
mass mobilization did not feature powerful coercive entrepreneurs. Critically, in all four 
cases, independence from colonial rule had been achieved through peaceful means. Hence, 
unlike in Indonesia, post-independence rulers did not face pockets of guerrilla fighters who 
would have been able to extract a payment for their loyalty. Moreover, compared to Thailand, 
militaries were relatively cohesive and unified. In the case of Taiwan, this was facilitated by 
the fact that, when the Kuomintang (KMT) withdrew to the island in 1949 to escape the 
Communist forces on the mainland, only the most loyal elements of the army followed party 
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leader Chiang Kai-shek (Gold 1986: 59). For the case of Malaysia, effective civilian control 
over the military is frequently attributed to the role that the British played in creating a 
professional and well-disciplined unit under colonial rule (Nathan and Govindasamy 2001: 
264). Singapore, on the other hand, was left without a significant military force when it 
gained independence from Malaysia in 1965; rather, the military was a creation of the 
People’s Action Party (PAP) government, which had come to power in 1959. The PAP 
followed the Israeli model of a citizen army, which put an effective check on any 
fragmentation tendencies in the organization of violence, as it meant that there were simply 
‘no clusters of politically motivated soldiers that could form a base for ambitious generals to 
exploit’ (Yong 2011: 161). Finally, in South Korea, the military – which had been built up 
with US aid and technical assistance – did show signs of fragmentation. However, military 
factions were mainly the result of strategic meddling by the first president, Rhee Syngman 
(1948-1960). The factions did not, unlike in Thailand, reflect ideological differences. As a 
result, the subsequent regime around Park Chung-hee had no difficulties in destroying these 
groups and maintaining a centralized monopoly of violence (Kim 1971: ch. 6). 
Not only had control over coercive means become centralized by the time universal 
suffrage was introduced, but mobilization resources, too, had come to be concentrated in the 
hands of metropolitan elites. In particular, unlike in the Philippines, political marketplaces 
did not contain landowners in control of significant clientelistic vote banks. In Taiwan and 
South Korea, landowning elites were considerably weakened through extensive land reform 
programs implemented after WWII. In South Korea, land reform was rolled out under intense 
pressure from US military authorities, driven by fears of peasant unrest and political 
instability (Jeon and Kim 2000). In Taiwan, on the other hand, land reform was initiated by 
the KMT in order to consolidate local political support for its ‘alien’ rule. The KMT was able 
to carry out land reform without serious resistance because, having arrived from ‘outside’, the 
party enjoyed a great deal of autonomy from local landlords (Wang 1999: 324). 
In contrast, Singapore and Malaysia had historically not been characterized by strong 
landholding classes. While in Singapore it was sheer geographical size that had prevented the 
emergence of a significant landed class, the mobilizational capacity of Malay landowners was 
weakened by the following two factors: first, similar to Indonesia, colonialism had resulted in 
a large share of agricultural land being controlled by foreign-owned plantations; second, 
arable land was still in abundant supply in the mid-20th century, which offered peasants 
ample opportunities for squatting and thus a way to escape clientelistic control by landowners 
(Booth 2007: 182). 
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It was in these concentrated marketplaces that political elites designed organizational 
vehicles for mass mobilization – in particular, political parties. And it was elites’ design 
decisions that explain why ‘elite cartel’ corruption became institutionalized in different ways. 
In Taiwan, the KMT leaders’ design choices were shaped by the Chinese Civil War. 
Specifically, after being forced to retreat to Taiwan as Communist forces advanced on the 
mainland, the party leadership came to the assessment that ‘the weakness of the KMT’s own 
organization [had] contributed to its defeat’ (Dickson 1993: 58). In an effort to emulate the 
organizational structures of the victorious Communist Party of China (CPC), the KMT 
created a dense network of branches and cells to penetrate society and the state bureaucracy. 
However, as an organization that had ‘colonized’ a people who did not feel Chinese, the 
KMT faced a particular problem – that is, the question of how to root itself in the local 
population. The KMT addressed this challenge by developing clientelistic linkages with local 
factions, thereby laying the foundation of Taiwan’s ‘elite cartel’ corruption. 
In Singapore, the PAP – rather than emulating the ‘mass party’ model – made moves to 
weaken its grassroots foundation after winning control of the government in 1959. This was 
because moderate party leaders feared that leftist factions could use the grassroots network as 
a launch pad for a power grab. Instead, PAP leaders worked towards fusing the party with the 
state – most notably, by assigning to local government units (such as Community Centres) 
the functions of party branches (Mauzy and Milne 2002: 95-96) and tying the provision of 
constituency-specific programs – such as infrastructure, social welfare provision, and housing 
subsidies – to electoral support for the PAP (Seng 1998: 389). Thus Singapore’s particular 
mode of ‘elite cartel’ corruption, characterized by collusion between political and 
bureaucratic elites, was established. 
Crucially, political elites in Taiwan and Singapore decided against nurturing a domestic 
capitalist class – for different reasons: while KMT leaders feared a strong Taiwanese business 
elite that could have developed into a threat to the party’s dominant position (Cheng 1990: 
150), the PAP leadership – driven by the reality that the domestic market was too small to 
support a program of import substitution industrialization – adopted a strategy of export-
oriented industrialization based primarily on investment by multinational companies (Rodan 
2006: 141-142). This contrasted starkly with South Korea and Malaysia, where state-led 
programs of industrialization gave rise to significant domestic business sectors in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Private business came to function as an important dispenser of illicit funding for 
the respective regime party, with significant implications for the institutionalization of ‘elite 
cartel’ corruption. 
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In South Korea, the Rhee regime planted the seeds for the emergence of large business 
conglomerates (the aforementioned chaebol) by selling Japanese-owned assets to loyal 
supporters for a fraction of their real worth and by gearing the US-funded program of import 
substitution industrialization towards cronies; however, it was the Park regime that – by 
paving the way for the inflow of commercial Japanese loans and by shifting to more capital-
intensive export-oriented industrialization – really accelerated the growth of the chaebol. The 
government’s main tool for industrial coordination was its tight control over the allocation of 
credit, which had been made possible by nationalizing the banking sector. As briefly 
mentioned above, this quasi-monopoly on credit allowed the Park regime to institutionalize a 
system of bribery, whereby high-ranking government officials would provide the chaebol 
with access to loans in exchange for the payment of fixed kickback rates. The illicit payments 
extracted from private business were an important source of funding for the regime’s 
Democratic Republic Party (DRP) (Kang 2002; Han 1972: 133-134) – and continue to 
characterize ‘elite cartel’ corruption in South Korea nowadays. 
In Malaysia, the UMNO initially relied on its links with the cash-rich Malaysia Chinese 
Association (MCA) – a coalition that was formally registered as the Alliance Party – for the 
funding of its operations. The UMNO became more financially independent after the 
introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1969 – a program aimed at promoting 
ethnic Malay entrepreneurs to help reduce the dominance of ethnic Chinese over the 
country’s business sector. For one, the UMNO set up a number of party-owned enterprises. 
Second, and more important for the discussion here, party leaders used their control over 
NEP resources to tie the newly nurtured Malay business elite into informal reciprocity 
networks. Over time, corrupt exchanges between the two sides took on an increasingly 
institutionalized nature, thus breeding strong ‘elite cartel’ networks that continue to serve as 
the backbone of corruption in Malaysia today (see Jomo and Gomez 2000; Gomez 1996). 
 
 
Comparative perspectives and conclusion 
 
While the emerging neo-institutionalist approach has considerably contributed to our 
understanding of corruption in the developing world, the question of how we can explain 
differences in the institutionalization of corruption has so far received very little attention. To 
address this gap in the literature, the paper here developed a systematic comparison of seven 
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developing and newly industrialized countries in East Asia. The argument that emerged 
through the analysis is that different corruption types were institutionalized during critical 
junctures around the middle of the 20th century when political elites, following the 
introduction of universal suffrage, had to make strategic choices regarding the organizational 
design of vehicles for mass mobilization. These choices were conditioned by the political 
marketplace: where the bargaining power of loyalty sellers was high, cooperation in mass 
mobilization had to be ‘bought’ through ‘oligarchs and clans’ and ‘official moguls’ 
corruption; where political marketplaces did not feature significant loyalty sellers, corruption 
became institutionalized in ‘elite cartel’ forms. In other words, historical sequencing 
mattered: countries in which the political marketplace had gone through a process of 
concentration before universal suffrage was introduced (Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Malaysia) are now marked by less harmful types of corruption than countries where mass 
voting rights were rolled out in a context of fragmented political marketplaces (Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand). 
Even though this argument was developed within the context of a limited geographical 
sample, there are good reasons to suggest that the paper’s findings can be generalized to the 
developing world as a whole. To begin with, we can establish that ‘oligarchs and clans’ and 
‘official moguls’ corruption are the most prevalent types of corruption in the developing 
world. This is not only based on Johnston’s (2005) own research but also on the work of 
regional studies experts that highlights how corruption in the developing worlds tends to be 
structured around fierce competition over public resources between powerful networks, such 
as ‘big man’ networks in Sub-Sahara Africa (e.g., Utas 2012) or camarillas in parts of Latin 
America (e.g., Morris 1991). Moreover, we know that, typically, mass suffrage was rolled out 
under conditions of highly fragmented political marketplaces. In Latin America, most 
countries had adopted universal male suffrage at the end of the 19th century, at a time when 
powerful landlords continued to control the vote of the rural peasantry and, in some cases, 
caudillo warlords remained a powerful force (see Drake 2009). In Sub-Sahara Africa, 
elections were, broadly speaking, introduced with decolonization in the mid-20th century – 
yet again, political marketplaces were generally characterized by high levels of 
fragmentation. This was primarily due to colonialism, which – as Berman (1998: 330) 
explains – ‘rested largely on the institutionalization of “Big Man-Small Boy” politics in rural 
society, built on the hierarchies of personal rule of the “decentralized despotism” of chiefs 
and headmen.’ In other words, colonial rule had – by sponsoring local strongmen – led to a 
large number of powerful loyalty sellers whose support in electoral contests could only be 
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secured by keeping formal institutions weak and providing ample opportunities for 
corruption. 
In addition, not only do these broad patterns support the generalizability of the 
sequencing argument developed in the preceding paper, but further evidence can be produced 
through a brief comparative sketch of four countries that are frequently referred to as anti-
corruption overachievers – Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Botswana. 
To begin with, at the time when universal suffrage was adopted in these four countries, 
control over mobilizational resources was relatively concentrated. In the cases of Uruguay, 
Costa Rica and Botswana, this was largely due to the fact that, unlike in the case of the 
Philippines discussed in much detail earlier, the social fabric in rural areas did not provide a 
fertile seedbed for patron-client relations: while in both Uruguay and Botswana agriculture 
was dominated by labor-light cattle ranching, most farmers in Costa Rica were small holders. 
In Chile, clientelism did structure social relations in the countryside. However, universal 
suffrage arrived comparatively late (1925). Crucially, male universal suffrage was introduced 
after industrialization had given rise to a large working class, which, in turn, meant that – by 
the time more extensive voting rights took effect – urban-based mass parties had built up 
considerable mobilizational resources. These parties then extended their organizational 
structures into the countryside and thus broke landowners’ hold over the peasantry (Loveman 
1976). 
Moreover, in all four cases, control over coercive resources was, unlike in the cases of 
Indonesia and Thailand, not fragmented when universal voting rights were implemented. 
Both Chile and Costa Rica are usually seen as exceptional in the sense that they largely 
avoided the problem of caudillismo that gripped most of Latin America after decolonization; 
similarly, independence in Botswana did not, unlike in many other countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, trigger civil conflict or a succession of military coups. Uruguay did go through a long 
period of warlordism after the end of colonial rule; however, the central state established a 
firm monopoly on the use of violence by the end of the 19th century – that is, at least two 
decades before universal voting rights for men were adopted (1918). 
In short, this paper has presented considerable evidence that differences in the 
institutionalization of corruption between developing countries have historical origins. More 
generally, this supports the neo-institutional argument that corruption – once institutionalized 
– is subject to path-dependent effects. 
The lessons for the analysis of corruption are manifold. Most importantly, combining 
Johnston’s (2005) corruption typology with neo-institutionalist theories of corruption – in 
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particular, the transaction costs variant (e.g., Graf Lambsdorff 2007; Della Porta and 
Vannucci 2012) – highlights that, in contexts were corruption is systemic, corruption tends to 
be organized collectively by informal networks whose dense links reach deep into the state to 
extract resources for the strengthening of particularistic loyalties. This network logic means 
that the individualistic risk-benefit calculation on which the institutional economics approach 
is based breaks down. Specifically, networks significantly lower the risk of corruption by 
harboring certain resources for the facilitation of corruption (such as know-how and 
information) and by generating social capital between network members. Once the 
organization of corruption has become institutionalized around ‘oligarchs and clans’ or 
‘official moguls’ network, political reforms designed on the basis of methodological 
individualism (as put forward by the institutional economics approach) will do very little to 
combat corruption. For example, corruption networks possess the ability to capture 
democracy’s key institutions, thereby severely undermining these institutions’ monitoring 
and punishment capacities.  
Future research on the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the developing 
world is thus well advised to not only replace the focus on the individual with a greater 
concern for the role of networks, but also to pay more attention to the qualitative differences 
in how corruption markets are organized, rather than relying on quantitative indicators 
derived from expert-based assessments. 
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TABLE 1: Corruption types in developing and newly industrialized East Asia 
 Principals 
actors 
Objective Means Cases 
Influence market private business; 
politicians 
“buy” influence 
over specific 
decisions 
political 
contributions, 
bribes  
--- 
Elite cartel colluding elites preserve status 
quo; solidify elite 
networks 
politicizing 
bureaucracy; 
kickbacks; 
sharing corruption 
profits 
Singapore; 
Taiwan; South 
Korea; Malaysia 
Oligarchs and 
clans 
“big men” protecting 
corruption profits 
from competitors; 
predictability in 
business, 
government 
large-scale theft 
and fraud 
Thailand; 
Philippines 
Official moguls inner circle exploit political 
dominance 
theft of public, 
private assets 
Indonesia 
Source: Author’s own classification of cases based on framework in Johnston (2014). 
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